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Abstract 
This paper develops a new framework for examining the distributional consequences of international 
trade that incorporates firm and worker heterogeneity, search and matching frictions in the labor 
market, and screening of workers by firms. Larger firms pay higher wages and exporters pay higher 
wages than non-exporters. The opening of trade enhances wage inequality and raises unemployment, 
but expected welfare gains are ensured if workers are risk neutral. And while wage inequality is larger 
in a trade equilibrium than in autarky, reductions of trade impediments can either raise or reduce wage 
inequality.  
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Two core issues in international trade are the allocation of resources across economic activities
and the distribution of incomes across factors of production. Recent research has emphasized
the allocation of resources across heterogeneous ﬁrms, but has largely concentrated on hetero-
geneity in the product market (productivity and size) rather than the labor market (workforce
composition and wages). Developing trade models that incorporate both product and labor
market heterogeneity is therefore important for explaining ﬁrm data and understanding the
consequences of trade liberalization. To the extent that wages vary across ﬁrms within sectors,
reallocations of resources across ﬁrms provide an additional channel for international trade to
inﬂuence income distribution.
In this paper, we develop a new framework for examining the distributional consequences
of trade that incorporates this channel and captures three plausible features of product and
labor markets. First, there is heterogeneity in ﬁrm productivity, which generates diﬀerences
in ﬁrm proﬁtability. Second, search and matching frictions in the labor market imply that
workers outside a ﬁrm are imperfect substitutes for those inside the ﬁrm, which gives rise to
multilateral bargaining between each ﬁrm and its workers. Third, workers are heterogeneous
in terms of match-speciﬁc ability, which can be imperfectly observed by ﬁrms. Together these
three components of the model generate variation in wages across ﬁrms within industries and
imply that trade liberalization aﬀects income distribution.
Our model accounts for a number of empirical ﬁndings from micro data on ﬁrms and work-
ers. Wage dispersion within industries is closely linked to productivity dispersion (e.g., Davis
and Haltiwanger 1991 and Faggio, Silvanes and Van Reenen 2007) and the model exhibits the
empirically—observed employer—size wage premium (e.g., Oi and Idson 1991). Wage dispersion is
also closely linked to trade participation, with exporters paying higher wages than non-exporters,
as found empirically by Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1997) and many subsequent studies. This
exporter wage premium is accompanied by diﬀerences in workforce composition across ﬁrms, as
observed by Kaplan and Verhoogen (2006), Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007), and Munch
and Skaksen (2008). Finally, the model is consistent with empirical evidence of search and
matching frictions and frictional unemployment (e.g., Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001).
The key mechanisms underlying these properties of the model are as follows. Complementar-
ities between workers’ abilities in the production technology imply that ﬁrms have an incentive
to screen workers to exclude those of lower ability. As the strength of these production comple-
mentarities increases with ﬁrm productivity, more productive ﬁrms screen more intensively and
have workforces of higher average ability than less productive ﬁrms. Search frictions imply mul-
tilateral bargaining between a ﬁrm and its workers, and since higher ability workforces are more
costly to replace, more productive ﬁrms consequently pay higher wages. When the economy is
opened to trade, the selection of more productive ﬁrms into exporting increases their revenue
relative to less productive ﬁrms, which further enhances their incentive to screen workers to
exclude those of lower ability. The open economy is therefore characterized by diﬀerences in
1workforce composition and wages between exporters and non—exporters. Search frictions imply
that wage dispersion is combined with equilibrium unemployment, and workers with the same
characteristics can be matched with ﬁrms paying diﬀerent wages. Worker screening generates
the noted variation in ﬁrm workforce composition despite random search.
I nt h ec l o s e de c o n o m y ,w ed e r i v eas u ﬃcient statistic for wage inequality, which determines all
scale-invariant measures of wage inequality, such as the Coeﬃcient of Variation, Gini Coeﬃcient
and Theil Index. This suﬃcient statistic depends on the dispersion parameters for worker ability
and ﬁrm productivity as well as other producta n dl a b o rm a r k e tp a r a m e t e r st h a ti n ﬂuence
workforce composition. Greater dispersion of worker ability has ambiguous eﬀects on wage
inequality, because it aﬀects both relative wages and employment levels across ﬁrms. In contrast,
greater dispersion of ﬁrm productivity raises wage inequality, because more productive ﬁrms pay
higher wages.
In the open economy, only the most productive ﬁrms export; ﬁrms of intermediate produc-
tivity serve only the domestic market; and the least productive ﬁrms exit without producing
because they cannot cover ﬁxed production costs. The open economy wage distribution is a
mixture of the wage distributions for employees of domestic and exporting ﬁrms, with exporters
paying higher wages than non-exporters. Therefore the open economy wage distribution depends
on the fraction of exporters and the exporter wage premium, as well as on the suﬃcient statistic
for wage inequality from the closed economy. Opening closed economies to trade increases wages
and employment at high-productivity exporters relative to low-productivity domestic ﬁrms. As
a result the opening of trade raises wage inequality for any measure of wage inequality that
respects second-order stochastic dominance.
Once the economy is open to trade, the relationship between wage inequality and the fraction
of exporting ﬁrms is non-monotonic. In particular, in the limiting case in which all ﬁrms export,
there is the same level of wage inequality in the open and closed economies. When all ﬁrms
export, a small reduction in the share of exporting ﬁrms increases wage inequality, because of
the lower wages paid by domestic ﬁrms. Similarly, when no ﬁrm exports, a small increase in the
share of exporting ﬁrms raises wage inequality, because of the higher wages paid by exporters.
These results for wage inequality hold for each country and for arbitrary asymmetries be-
tween countries. Our analysis is therefore consistent with empirical ﬁndings of increased wage
inequality in both developed and developing countries following trade liberalization (see for ex-
ample the survey by Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). These predictions contrast with those of the
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which implies rising wage inequality
in developed countries and declining wage inequality in developing countries. As changes in wage
inequality in our framework are driven by reallocations across ﬁrms, our analysis is also consis-
tent with empirical evidence that the vast majority of the reallocation observed following trade
liberalization takes place within rather than between industries. Finally, as wage inequality in
our model arises from heterogeneity in unobserved match-speciﬁc ability, our results are also
compatible with the observation that changes in the return to observed skills typically account
for a relatively small share of the overall increase in wage inequality following trade liberalization
2(see for example Attanasio et al. 2004 and Menezes-Filho et al. 2008).
The presence of equilibrium unemployment introduces a distinction between the distribution
of income across all workers and the distribution of wages across employed workers. Labor
market frictions have symmetric eﬀects on ﬁrms of all productivities, and hence do not aﬀect
the suﬃcient statistic for wage inequality in the closed economy, but do aﬀect unemployment
and hence income inequality. Opening closed economies to trade generally raises unemployment,
because it reduces the share of matched workers that are hired, but under some conditions trade
can also raise the share of job-seekers that are matched, which reduces unemployment.
Together these predictions for wage inequality and unemployment imply that the distribu-
tional consequences of trade liberalization are quite diﬀerent from those in neoclassical trade
theory. Workers employed by high-productivity exporting ﬁrms receive higher real wages in the
open economy than in the closed economy. In contrast, workers employed by low-productivity
domestic ﬁrms may receive lower or higher real wages in the open economy than in the closed
economy. Finally, because unemployment is typically higher in the open economy than in the
closed economy, there are more workers with the lowest real income in the open economy.
In addition to these distributional consequences for ex post welfare, the opening of trade
also has implications for ex ante expected welfare. Ex ante workers face income risk because
of unemployment and wage dispersion across ﬁrms. With incomplete insurance, the increase
in unemployment and wage inequality induced by the opening of trade increases income risk.
Nonetheless, as long as workers are risk neutral, expected welfare gains are ensured.
Our paper is related to recent research on ﬁrm heterogeneity in international trade building
on the inﬂuential framework of Melitz (2003), including Antràs and Helpman (2004), Bernard
et al. (2007), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and Helpman et al. (2004).1 While this literature
yields rich predictions for the product market, ﬁrms pay workers with the same characteristics
the same wage irrespective of ﬁrm productivity, which sits awkwardly with a large empirical
literature that ﬁnds an employer—size wage premium and rent—sharing within ﬁrms.
This study is also related to the literature on international trade and labor market frictions.
One strand of this literature assumes that ﬁrm wages are related to productivity, revenue or
proﬁts because of “eﬃciency wage” or “fair wage” concerns, including Amiti and Davis (2008),
Egger and Kreickemeier (2007, 2008) and Grossman and Helpman (2008).2 In contrast, the
relationship between ﬁrm wages and revenue in our framework is derived from worker hetero-
geneity and labor market frictions. As a result, our model implies quite diﬀerent determinants
of wage inequality and unemployment, which include the dispersion of worker ability and the
other product and labor market parameters that inﬂuence workforce composition, as well as the
dispersion of ﬁrm productivity.
Another strand of this literature, more closely related to our own work, examines the impli-
cations of search frictions for trade, including Davidson et al. (1988, 1999), Felbermayr et al.
(2008, 2009) and Helpman and Itskhoki (2009). Our main point of departure from this literature
1For alternative approaches to ﬁrm heterogeneity and trade, see Bernard et al. (2003) and Yeaple (2005).
2A related trade literature examines eﬃciency wages and unemployment, including Davis and Harrigan (2007).
3is the introduction of worker heterogeneity and imperfect screening of workers by ﬁrms, which
generates wage inequality that is inﬂuenced by both trade liberalization and labor market fric-
tions. While Davidson et al. (2008) also develop a model of ﬁrm and worker heterogeneity with
an exporter wage premium, they assume one—to—one matching between ﬁrms and workers and
only two types of ﬁrms and workers. In contrast, our framework allows for ﬁrm matching with
multiple workers, endogenous determination of employment (size), and continuous distributions
of ﬁrm productivity and worker ability. As a result, the opening of trade changes both employ-
ment and wages across ﬁrms of heterogeneous productivity, which changes the wage distribution
and generates the non-monotonic relationship between wage inequality and trade openness.
Our paper is also related to the broader economics literature on matching. One strand of
this literature is concerned with competitive assignment models, and investigates the conditions
under which there is assortative matching, including Heckman and Honore (1990), Ohnsorge and
Treﬂer (2007), Legros and Newman (2007), and Costinot and Vogel (2009). In contrast, another
strand of this literature considers search frictions in the labor market, including in particular
Mortensen (1970), Pissarides (1974), Diamond (1982a,b), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and
Pissarides (2000).
Within the search literature, several approaches have been taken to explaining wage diﬀer-
ences across workers. One inﬂuential line of research follows Burdett and Mortensen (1998) in
analyzing wage dispersion in models of wage posting and random search. Another important
line of research examines wage dispersion when both ﬁrms and workers are heterogeneous, in-
cluding models of pure random search such as Acemoglu (1999), Shimer and Smith (2000) and
Albrecht and Vroman (2002), and models incorporating on—the—job—search such as Postel—Vinay
and Robin (2002), Cahuc et al. (2006) and Lentz (2008).
Our modelling of labor market frictions is related to the one—period search models of Ace-
moglu (1999) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). For example, in Acemoglu (1999), ﬁrms decide
whether to invest in either high or low capacity and are then matched with either a skilled or
unskilled worker. One key diﬀerence between our approach and these models is that we allow
for an endogenous measure of matched workers for each ﬁrm rather than one—to—one matching
between ﬁrms and workers. As a result, more productive ﬁrms expand on the extensive margin
of the measure of matched workers until the marginal contribution of each worker to variable
proﬁts is equal to the common search cost. In the absence of diﬀerences in workforce composi-
tion, this extensive margin expansion generates the same wage across ﬁrms of all productivities
equal to the common replacement cost of a worker.
As e c o n dk e yd i ﬀerence is that we combine search frictions with worker screening. While
search frictions give rise to equilibrium unemployment, screening generates variation in workforce
composition and hence wages across ﬁrms. In contrast to models with a limited number of ﬁrm
and worker types, our analysis also incorporates continuous distributions of ﬁrm productivity
and worker ability. Nonetheless, our framework remains suﬃciently tractable that it can be used
to examine the general equilibrium implications of the opening of international trade. Trade
liberalization changes the measure of workers matched and screening intensities across ﬁrms of
4each productivity within industries, aﬀecting wage inequality and unemployment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and its
sectoral equilibrium. Section 3 presents our results on sectoral wage inequality, Section 4 presents
our results on sectoral unemployment, and Section 5 presents our results on sectoral income
inequality. Section 6 examines alternative ways of closing the model to study the feedback from
general equilibrium outcomes to the sectoral equilibrium. Section 7 concludes. A web—based
Appendix contains technical details, including proofs of various results.
2 Sectoral Equilibrium
The key predictions of our model relate to the distribution of wages and employment across ﬁrms
and workers within sectors. As these predictions hold for any given values of expected worker
income, prices in other sectors and aggregate income, we begin in this section by characterizing
sectoral equilibrium for given values of these variables, before determining these variables in
general equilibrium in Section 6 below. Throughout the analysis of sectoral equilibrium, all
prices, revenues and costs are measured in terms of a numeraire, where the choice of numeraire
is speciﬁed in the analysis of general equilibrium in Section 6.
2.1 Model Setup
We consider a world of two countries, home and foreign, where foreign variables are denoted by an
asterisk. In each country there is a continuum of workers who are ex ante identical. Initially, we
assume workers are risk neutral, but we extend the analysis to introduce risk aversion in Section
6. The supply of workers to the sector is endogenously determined by expected income. Demand
within the sector is deﬁned over the consumption of a continuum of horizontally diﬀerentiated
varieties and takes the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form. The real consumption






, 0 <β<1, (1)
where j indexes varieties; J is the set of varieties within the sector; q(j) denotes consumption
of variety j;a n dβ controls the elasticity of substitution between varieties. To simplify notation,
we suppress the sector subscript except where important, and while we display expressions for
home, analogous relationships hold for foreign. The price index dual to Q is denoted by P and
depends on the prices p(j) of individual varieties j. Given this speciﬁcation of sectoral demand,
the equilibrium revenue of a ﬁrm is:
r(j)=p(j)q(j)=Aq(j)β, (2)
5where Ai is a demand-shifter for sector i, which depends on the dual price index for the sector
(Pi), prices in other sectors (P−i) and aggregate income (Ω).3 The precise functional form
for the demand-shifter, Ai = ˜ Ai (P,Ω), depends on the speciﬁcation of demand across sectors,
as discussed further when we analyze general equilibrium below. Each ﬁrm takes the demand
shifter as given when making its decisions, because it supplies one of a continuum of varieties
within the sector, and is therefore of measure zero relative to the sector as a whole.
The product market is modeled in the same way as in Melitz (2003). There is a competitive
fringe of potential ﬁrms who can choose to enter the diﬀerentiated sector by paying an entry
cost of fe > 0.O n c eaﬁrm incurs the sunk entry cost, it observes its productivity θ,w h i c hi s
independently distributed and drawn from a Pareto distribution Gθ (θ)=1− (θmin/θ)
z for θ ≥
θmin > 0 and z>1. The Pareto distribution is not only tractable, but together with our other
assumptions implies a Pareto ﬁrm-size distribution, which provides a reasonable approximation
to observed data (see Axtell 2001). Since in equilibrium all ﬁrms with the same productivity
behave symmetrically, we index ﬁrms by θ from now onwards.
Once ﬁrms observe their productivity, they decide whether to exit, produce solely for the
domestic market, or produce for both the domestic and export market. Production involves a
ﬁxed cost of fd > 0 units of the numeraire. Similarly, exporting involves a ﬁxed cost of fx > 0
units of the numeraire and an iceberg variable trade cost, such that τ>1 units of a variety
must be exported in order for one unit to arrive in the foreign market.
Output of each variety (y) depends on the productivity of the ﬁrm (θ), the measure of
workers hired (h), and the average ability of these workers (¯ a):
y = θhγ¯ a, 0 <γ<1. (3)
This production technology can be interpreted as capturing either human capital complemen-
tarities (e.g., production in teams where the productivity of a worker depends on the average
productivity of her team) or a managerial time constraint (e.g., a manager with a ﬁxed amount
of time who needs to allocate some time to each worker). In the web-based technical appendix,
we derive the production technology under each of these interpretations. A key feature of the
production technology is complementarities in worker ability, where the productivity of a worker
is increasing in the abilities of other workers employed by the ﬁrm.4
The labor market features heterogeneity in worker ability and search and matching frictions.
3We use bold typeface to denote vectors, so that P−i is a vector of all price indexes Pj other than i and P is a
















and Ei is total expenditure on varieties within the sector, which depends on aggregate income (Ω), the price index
for the sector (Pi) and prices for all other sectors (P−i).
4The existence of these production complementarities is the subject of a long line of research in economics,
including Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982), and Garicano (2000). For empirical evidence see for example Moretti
(2004).
6Worker ability is assumed to be match-speciﬁc, independently distributed and drawn from a
Pareto distribution, Ga (a)=1− (amin/a)
k for a ≥ amin > 0 and k>1. Since worker ability is
match-speciﬁc and independently distributed, a worker’s ability draw for a given match conveys
no information about ability draws for other potential matches. Search and matching frictions
are modeled following the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides approach. A ﬁrm that pays
a search cost of bn units of the numeraire can randomly match with a measure of n workers,
where the search cost b is endogenously determined by the tightness of the labor market as
discussed below.
Consistent with a large empirical literature in labor economics, we assume that match-speciﬁc
worker ability cannot be costlessly observed when ﬁrms and workers are matched.5 Instead, we
assume that ﬁrms can undertake costly investments in worker screening to obtain an imprecise
signal of worker ability, which is in line with a recent empirical literature on ﬁrm screening and
other recruitment policies.6 To capture the idea of an imprecise signal in as tractable a way
as possible, we assume that by paying a screening cost of caδ
c/δ units of the numeraire, where
c>0 and δ>0,aﬁrm can identify workers with an ability below ac.7 Screening costs are
increasing in the ability threshold ac chosen by the ﬁrm, because more complex and costlier
tests are required for higher ability cutoﬀs.8
This speciﬁcation of worker screening is inﬂuenced by empirical evidence that more produc-
tive ﬁrms not only employ more workers but also screen more intensively, have workforces of
higher average ability and pay higher wages. Each of these features emerges naturally from
our speciﬁcation of production and screening, as demonstrated below, because production com-
plementarities imply a greater return to screening for more productive ﬁrms and the costs of
screening are the same for all ﬁrms. Our formulation also ensures that the multilateral bargain-
ing game between ﬁrms and workers over the surplus from production remains tractable. As
the only information revealed by screening is which workers have match-speciﬁc abilities above
and below ac, neither the ﬁrm nor the workers know the match-speciﬁc abilities of individual
workers, and hence bargaining occurs under conditions of symmetric information.
2.2 Firm’s Problem
The complementarities between workers’ abilities in the production technology provide the in-
centive for ﬁrms to screen workers. By screening and not employing workers with abilities less
5For example, Altonji and Pierret (2003) ﬁnd that as employers learn about worker productivity the wage
equation coeﬃcients on easily observed characteristics, such as education, fall relative to the coeﬃcients on hard-
to-observe correlates of worker productivity.
6For empirical evidence on the resources devoted by ﬁr m st ot h es c r e e n i n go fj o ba p p l i c a n t s ,s e ef o re x a m p l e
Barron et al. (1985), Barron et al. (1987), Pellizari (2005), and Autor and Scarborough (2007).
7In this formulation, there is a ﬁxed cost of screening, even when the screening is not informative, i.e., when
ac = amin. We focus on interior equilibria in which ﬁrms of all productivities choose screening tests that are
informative, ac >a min,a n ds ot h eﬁxed cost of screening is always incurred. As we show below, this is the case
when the screening cost, c,i ss u ﬃciently small.
8There are therefore increasing returns to scale in screening. All results generalize immediately to the case
where the screening costs are separable in ac and n and linear in n.
7than ac,aﬁrm reduces output (and hence revenue and proﬁts) by decreasing the measure of
workers hired (h), but raises output by increasing average worker ability (¯ a). Since there are
diminishing returns to the number of workers hired (0 <γ<1), output can be increased by
s c r e e n i n ga sl o n ga st h e r ei ss u ﬃcient dispersion in worker ability (suﬃciently low k).9 With a
Pareto distribution of worker ability, a ﬁrm that chooses a screening threshold ac hires a mea-
sure h = n(amin/ac)
k of workers with average ability ¯ a = kac/(k−1). Therefore the production
technology can be re-written as follows:
y = κyθnγa1−γk






where we require 0 <γ k<1 for a ﬁrm to have an incentive to screen.10
Given consumer love of variety and a ﬁxed production cost, no ﬁrm will ever serve the export
market without also serving the domestic market. If a ﬁrm exports, it allocates its output (y(θ))
between the domestic and export markets (yd (θ) and yx (θ), respectively) to equate its marginal
revenues in the two markets, which from (2) implies [yd (θ)/yx (θ)]
β−1 = τ−β (A∗/A). Therefore
a ﬁrm’s total revenue can be expressed as follows:
r(θ) ≡ rd (θ)+rx (θ)=Υ(θ)
1−β Ay (θ)
β , (5)
where rd (θ) ≡ Ayd (θ)
β is revenue from domestic sales and rx (θ) ≡ A∗ [yx (θ)/τ]
β is revenue
from exporting. The variable Υ(θ) captures a ﬁrm’s “market access,” which depends on whether
it chooses to serve both the domestic and foreign markets or only the domestic market:










where Ix (θ) is an indicator variable that equals one if the ﬁrm exports and zero otherwise.11
After having observed its productivity, a ﬁrm chooses whether or not to produce, whether
or not to export, the measure of workers to sample, and the screening ability threshold (and
hence the measure of workers to hire). Once these decisions have been made, the ﬁrm and its
hired workers engage in strategic bargaining with equal weights over the division of revenue
from production in the manner proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b). The only information
known by ﬁrms and workers at the bargaining stage is that each hired worker has an ability
greater than ac. Therefore, the expected ability of each worker is ¯ a = k/(k − 1)ac,a n de a c h
9Since production complementarities provide the incentive for ﬁrms to screen, the marginal product of workers
with abilities below ac is negative, as shown in the web-based technical appendix. While worker screening is a
key feature of ﬁrms’ recruitment policies, and production complementarities provide a tractable explanation for
it, other explanations are also possible, such as ﬁxed costs of maintaining an employment relationship (e.g. in
terms of oﬃce space or other scarce resources).
10In contrast, when γ>1/k,n oﬁrm screens and the model reduces to the model of Helpman and Itskhoki
(2009), which has no screening or worker heterogeneity. We do not discuss this case here.
11Note that [yd (θ)/yx (θ)]
β−1 = τ
−β (A
∗/A) and yd (θ)+yx (θ)=y(θ) imply yd (θ)=y (θ)/Υ(θ) and yx (θ)=
y (θ)[Υ(θ) − 1]/Υ(θ), and hence rd (θ)=r(θ)/Υ(θ) and rx (θ)=r(θ)[Υ(θ) − 1]/Υ(θ).
8worker is treated as if they have an ability of ¯ a. Combining (3) and (5), ﬁrm revenue can
be written as r = Υ(θ)
1−β A(θ¯ a)βhβγ, which is continuous, increasing and concave in h.A s
the ﬁxed production, ﬁxed exporting, search and screening costs have all been sunk before the
bargaining stage, all other arguments of ﬁrm revenue are ﬁxed. Furthermore, the outside option
of hired workers is unemployment, whose value we normalize to zero. Therefore, the solution to
the bargaining game is that the ﬁrm receives the fraction 1/(1 + βγ) of revenue (5), while each
worker receives the fraction βγ/(1 + βγ) of average revenue per worker.12
Anticipating the outcome of the bargaining game, the ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts. Combining





























c − fd − Ixfx
)
, (7)
where Ix is the export status indicator, which equals 1 when the ﬁrm exports and 0 otherwise.
The ﬁrm’s decision whether or not to produce and whether or not to export takes a standard
form. The presence of a ﬁxed production cost implies that there is a zero-proﬁtc u t o ﬀ for
productivity, θd, such that a ﬁrm drawing a productivity below θd exits without producing.
Similarly, the presence of a ﬁxed exporting cost implies that there is an exporting cutoﬀ for
productivity, θx, such that a ﬁrm drawing a productivity below θx does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
serve the export market. Given that a large empirical literature ﬁnds evidence of selection into
export markets, where only the most productive ﬁr m se x p o r t ,w ef o c u so nv a l u e so ft r a d ec o s t s
for which θx >θ d >θ min.13 The ﬁrm market access variable is therefore determined as follows:
Υ(θ)=
(












The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions for the measure of workers sampled (n) and the screening ability







These conditions imply that ﬁrms with larger revenue sample more workers and screen to a
higher ability threshold. While the measure of workers hired, h = n(amin/ac)
k,i si n c r e a s i n gi n
the measure of workers sampled, n, it is decreasing in the screening ability threshold, ac. Under
12See Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2007) and the web-based technical appendix for the derivation of the
solution to the bargaining game.
13For empirical evidence of selection into export markets, see for example Bernard and Jensen (1995) and
Roberts and Tybout (1997).
9the assumption δ>k , ﬁrms with larger revenue not only sample more workers but also hire
more workers. Finally, from the division of revenue in the bargaining game, the total wage bill
is a constant share of revenue, which implies that ﬁrm wages are monotonically increasing in















Thus, ﬁrms with larger revenue have higher screening ability cutoﬀs and pay higher wages, but




which implies that workers have no incentive to direct their search.14 Combining the measure
of workers hired, h = n(amin/ac)
k,w i t ht h eﬁrst-order conditions above yields the following





Therefore, under the assumption δ>k , the model exhibits an employer-size wage premium,
where ﬁrms that employ more workers pay higher wages.
Using the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions, ﬁrm revenue (5) and the production technology (4),
we can solve explicitly for ﬁrm revenue as a function of ﬁrm productivity (θ), the demand shifter








where Γ ≡ 1 − βγ − β(1 − γk)/δ > 0, and the constant κr is deﬁned in the web-based
technical appendix. An implication of this expression is that the relative revenue of any





Finally, using the two ﬁrst-order conditions in the ﬁrm’s problem (7), ﬁrm proﬁts can be




r(θ) − fd − Ix (θ)fx. (11)
14We note that search frictions and wage bargaining alone are not enough to generate wage variation across
ﬁrms in our model. From the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition for the number of workers sampled, each ﬁrm equates
workers’ share of revenue per sampled worker to the common search cost. In the special case of our model without
worker heterogeneity and screening, all sampled workers are hired, which implies that each ﬁrm’s wage is equal to
the common search cost. Moreover, directed search, which is sometimes used to generate wage dispersion–as in
Moen (1997) and Mortensen and Wright (2002)–will not do so here, because workers receive the same expected
wage conditional on being matched irrespective of ﬁrm productivity.
102.3 Sectoral Variables
To determine sectoral equilibrium, we use the recursive structure of the model. In a ﬁrst bloc of
equations, we solve for the tightness of the labor market (x, x∗) and search costs (b, b∗)i ne a c h
country. In a second bloc of equations, we solve for the zero-proﬁt productivity cutoﬀs( θd, θ∗
d),
the exporting productivity cutoﬀs( θx, θ∗
x), and sectoral demand shifters (A, A∗). A third and
ﬁnal bloc of equations determines the remaining components of sectoral equilibrium: the dual
price index (P, P∗), the real consumption index (Q, Q∗), the mass of ﬁrms (M, M∗), and the
size of the labor force (L, L∗). As discussed above, we solve for sectoral equilibrium for given
values of expected income in the sector (ω, ω∗), prices in other sectors (P−i, P∗
−i) and aggregate
incomes (Ω, Ω∗), which are determined in general equilibrium below.
2.3.1 Labor Market Tightness and Hiring Costs
Following the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search model, the search cost (b)i sa s -
sumed to be increasing in labor market tightness (x):
b = α0xα1,α 0 > 1,α 1 > 0, (12)
where labor market tightness equals the ratio of workers sampled (N) to workers searching
for employment in the sector (L): x = N/L.15 Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the
supply of workers searching for employment in the sector depends on expected worker income,
which equals the probability of being sampled (x) times the expected wage conditional on being
sampled (w(θ)h(θ)/n(θ)=b from the analysis above):
ω = xb, (13)
where we discuss in Section 6 how this condition is modiﬁed under the assumption of risk
aversion. Together (12) and (13) determine the search cost and labor market tightness (b, x)













w h e r ew ea s s u m eα0 >ωso that 0 <x<1, as discussed in Section 6 below. Analogous
relationships determine search costs and labor market tightness (b∗, x∗)f o rag i v e nv a l u eo f
expected income (ω∗) in foreign. The search cost in (14) depends solely on parameters of the
search technology (α0, α1) and expected income (ω). In particular, we have
15As shown by Blanchard and Gali (2008) and in the web-based technical appendix, this relationship can be
derived from a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas matching function and a cost of posting vacancies. The
parameter α0 is increasing in the cost of posting vacancies and decreasing in the productivity of the matching
technology, while α1 depends on the weight of vacancies in the Cobb-Douglas matching function. Other static
models of search and matching include Acemoglu (1999) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999).
11Lemma 1 The search cost b and the measure of labor market tightness x are both increasing in
expected worker income ω.
Proof. The lemma follows immediately from equation (14).
When we characterize general equilibrium in Section 6 below, we specify conditions under which
expected income (ω) is constant and those under which it changes with other endogenous vari-
ables. While we treat ω as given in solving for sectoral equilibrium, our results for sectoral
inequality and unemployment continue to hold when it responds in general equilibrium to other
endogenous variables, except where otherwise discussed.
2.3.2 Productivity Cutoﬀs and Demand
The two productivity cutoﬀs can be determined using ﬁrm revenue (10) and proﬁts (11). The
productivity cutoﬀ below which ﬁrms exit (θd) is determined by the requirement that a ﬁrm












Similarly, the exporting productivity cutoﬀ above which ﬁrms export (θx) is determined by the
requirement that at this productivity a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between serving only the domestic


























In equilibrium, we also require the free entry condition to hold, which equates the expected
value of entry to the sunk entry cost. Using the zero proﬁt and exporting cutoﬀ conditions,
(15) and (16) respectively, and the relationship between variety revenues for ﬁrms with diﬀerent



















dGθ = fe. (18)
Equations (15), (16) and (18) can be used to solve for home’s productivity cutoﬀs and the demand
shifter (θd, θx, A)f o rag i v e nv a l u eo ft h ef o r e i g nd e m a n ds h i f t e r( A∗), which only inﬂuences home
sectoral equilibrium through exporter market access (Υx > 1).16 Three analogous equations can
16In a symmetric equilibrium A = A
∗ and Υx =1+τ
−β
1−β , which implies that the ratio of the two productivity
cutoﬀs is pinned down by (17) alone.
12be used to solve for foreign variables (θ∗
d, θ∗
x, A∗) for a given value of A. Together these six
equations allow us to solve for the productivity cutoﬀs and demand shifters in the two countries
(θd, θx, A, θ∗
d, θ∗
x, A∗) for given values of search costs (b, b∗), which were determined in the
previous bloc of equations. Having solved for the productivity cutoﬀs and demand shifters, ﬁrm
market access in each country (Υ(θ), Υ∗ (θ)) follows immediately from (6).
The productivity cutoﬀs and demand shifter depend on two dimensions of trade openness in
(15), (16) and (18). First, both depend on an extensive margin of trade openness, as captured
by the ratio of the productivity cutoﬀs ρ ≡ θd/θx ∈ [0,1], which determines the fraction of
exporting ﬁrms [1 − Gθ (θx)]/[1 − Gθ (θd)] = ρz. Second, both depend on an intensive margin
of trade openness, as captured by the market access variable, Υx > 1, which determines the ratio
of revenues from domestic sales and exporting, as discussed in footnote 11. These two dimensions
of trade openness are linked through the relationship between the productivity cutoﬀs( 1 7 ) .
2.3.3 Expenditure, Mass of Firms and the Labor Force
Having solved for the demand shifter for sector i (Ai), the price index for that sector (Pi)c a n
be determined from consumer optimization given prices in all other sectors (P−i) and aggregate
income (Ω):
Ai = ˜ Ai (P,Ω). (19)
Having solved for the demand shifter (A) and the price index (P) for the sector (we now drop
the sectoral subscript i), the real consumption index (Q) follows from consumer optimization,




and yields total expenditure within the sector E = PQ. Similar relationships determine the
foreign price index, real consumption index and total expenditure (P∗, Q∗, E∗).
The mass of ﬁrms within the sector (M) can be determined from the market clearing condi-
tion that total domestic expenditure on diﬀerentiated varieties equals the sum of the revenues









x (θ)dGθ (θ). (21)
From rd (θ)=r(θ)/Υ(θ), rx (θ)=r(θ)(Υ(θ) − 1)/Υ(θ),17 and total ﬁrm revenue (10), domes-
tic and foreign revenue can be expressed in terms of variables that have already been determined
(θd, θx, Υ(θ)). Therefore we can solve for the mass of ﬁr m si ne a c hc o u n t r y( M, M∗)f r o m( 2 1 )
and a similar equation for foreign.
The mass of workers searching for employment in the sector (L) can be determined by












w h e r ew eh a v es o l v e df o rt h em a s so fﬁrms (M)a n dt o t a lﬁrm revenue (r(θ))a b o v e ,a n dw h e r e
a similar equation determines the sectoral labor force in foreign (L∗). Finally, we also require
that the sectoral labor force is less than or equal to the supply of labor (L ≤ ¯ L), as discussed in
Section 6 below. This completes our characterization of sectoral equilibrium.
2.4 Firm-speciﬁcV a r i a b l e s
Having characterized sectoral equilibrium, we can solve for all ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables using the
following two properties of the model. First, from ﬁrm revenue (10), the relative revenue of any
two ﬁrms depends solely on their relative productivities and relative market access. Second,
from ﬁrm proﬁts (10), the lowest productivity ﬁrm with productivity θd makes zero proﬁts.
Combining these two properties with the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions above, all ﬁrm-speciﬁc
variables can be written as functions of ﬁrm productivity (θ), ﬁrm market access (Υ(θ)), the
zero-proﬁt productivity cutoﬀ (θd), search costs (b) and parameters:
r(θ)=Υ(θ)
1−β
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(23)
where market access (Υ(θ)) is determined as a function of ﬁrm productivity in (8). Note that
ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables only depend on sectoral and general equilibrium through the zero-proﬁt
cutoﬀ productivity (θd), ﬁrm market access (Υ(θ)) and hence the exporting cutoﬀ productivity
(θx), and search costs (b).
The solutions for ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables (23) capture a number of key features of the het-
erogeneity observed across ﬁrms within sectors. More productive ﬁrms not only have higher
revenue, proﬁts and employment, as in the benchmark model of ﬁrm heterogeneity of Melitz
(2003), but also pay higher wages as shown in Figure 1. These results are consistent with em-
pirical evidence of rent-sharing whereby higher ﬁrm revenue and proﬁts are shared with workers
through higher wages (e.g., Van Reenen, 1996) and with the large empirical literature that ﬁnds
an employer size-wage premium (see the survey by Oi and Idson, 1999).18
18Combining the solutions for ﬁrm revenue and employment in (23) with the Pareto productivity distribution,
ﬁrm revenue and employment are also Pareto distributed, with shape parameters that depend on the dispersion
of ﬁrm productivity, the dispersion of worker ability, and product and labor market parameters that inﬂuence





























Figure 1: Wages as a function of ﬁrm productivity
Additionally, the diﬀerences in wages across ﬁrms are driven by diﬀerences in workforce
composition. More productive ﬁrms have workforces of higher average ability, which are more
costly to replace in the bargaining game, and therefore pay higher wages. These features of the
model are consistent with ﬁndings from matched employer-employee datasets that the employer-
size wage premium is largely explained by the positive correlation between employment and a
ﬁrm’s average worker ﬁxed eﬀect.19 T h er e a s o nm o r ep r o d u c t i v eﬁrms have workforces of higher
average ability in the model is that they screen more intensively, which also receives empirical
support. An emerging literature on ﬁrm recruitment policies provides evidence of more intensive
screening policies for larger ﬁrms and higher-wage matches.20
In our framework, workers with the same observed and unobserved characteristics receive
diﬀerent wages depending on the ﬁrm with which they are matched. While this feature of the
model is consistent with recent empirical ﬁndings of residual wage inequality (see for example
Autor et al. 2008, Lemieux 2006 and Mortensen 2003), competitive models without labor mar-
ket frictions can generate residual wage inequality if there are worker characteristics observed by
the ﬁrm but not by the econometrician. While the ﬁrm surely observes additional worker char-
acteristics, several features of the data suggest that this is not the only explanation for residual
wage inequality. In competitive frictionless models, arbitrage typically eliminates diﬀerences in
wages across ﬁr m sf o rw o r k e r sw i t ht h es a m ec h a r a c t e r i s t ics. Yet the empirical literature using
matched employer-employee datasets ﬁnds that ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects make a substantial contribu-
tion towards wage variation after controlling for time-varying worker characteristics and worker
ﬁxed eﬀects (see for example Abowd et al. 1999 and Abowd et al. 2002).21 The contribution
workforce composition. See Helpman et al. (2008a) for further discussion.
19See Figure 3 in Abowd et al. (1999) and the discussion in Abowd and Kramarz (1999).
20For example, Barron, Black and Loewenstein (1987) ﬁnd that expenditures on screening workers are positively
and signiﬁcantly related to employer size, while Pellizari (2005) ﬁnds that matches created through more intensive
screening pay higher wages.
21While competitive frictionless models with production complementarities induce strong assortative matching
15of the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects arises naturally in our framework from labor market frictions.22 We do
not however wish to overstate this point, as characteristics observed by the ﬁrm but not by the
econometrician could be more important empirically as a source of residual wage inequality.
Finally, our solutions for ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are also consistent with ﬁndings from the
recent empirical literature on exports and ﬁrm performance. As a result of ﬁxed costs of ex-
porting, there is a discrete jump in ﬁrm revenue at the productivity threshold for entry into
exporting (θx), where Υ(θ) jumps from 1 to Υx > 1, which implies a discrete jump in all
other ﬁrm variables. Therefore, exporters not only have higher revenue and employment than
non-exporters, as in the benchmark model of ﬁrm heterogeneity of Melitz (2003), but also pay
higher wages, as found empirically by Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1997) and many subsequent
studies. These diﬀerences in wages between exporters and non-exporters are accompanied by
diﬀerences in workforce composition, which as discussed above is consistent with recent empiri-
cal ﬁndings using matched employer-employee datasets (see for example Kaplan and Verhoogen
2006, Schank, Schnabel and Wagner 2007, and Munch and Skaksen 2008).
3 Sectoral Wage Inequality
While workers are ex ante identical and have the same expected income, there is ex post wage
inequality because workers receive diﬀerent wages depending on the employer with whom they
are matched. In this section, we consider the within-sector distribution of wages across employed
workers. This sectoral wage distribution is a weighted average of the distributions of wages for
workers employed by domestic ﬁrms, Gw,d(w), and for workers employed by exporters, Gw,x(w),





















where ρ and Υx are the extensive and intensive margins of trade openness deﬁned above; wd =
w(θd) is the wage paid by the least productive ﬁrm in (23); wd/ρkβ/δΓ = w(θ−
x ) is the wage paid
by the most productive non-exporter; and wdΥ
k(1−β)/δΓ
x /ρkβ/δΓ = w(θ+
x ) is the wage paid by the
between ﬁrms and workers, the empirical literature using matched employer-employee datasets ﬁn d saw e a ka n d
sometimes negative correlation between ﬁrm and worker ﬁxed eﬀects (see for example Abowd et al. 2002). In
a recent paper, de Melo (2008) shows that this negative correlation can occur even with assortative matching if
ﬁrms’ outside options are negatively correlated with their productivity. Therefore, de Melo (2008) examines the
correlation between a worker’s ﬁxed eﬀect and the average ﬁxed eﬀects of their coworkers, which he ﬁnds to be
positive, signiﬁcant and around one third. Combining search and screening frictions generates this positive but
imperfect correlation. When screening costs are inﬁnite, there is a zero correlation between coworker abilities,
because of random search. In contrast, for ﬁnite screening costs, the more intensive screening of more productive
ﬁrms induces a positive correlation between coworker abilities, which becomes stronger for lower screening costs.
22In our model, expected wages vary with both ﬁrm productivity and a worker’s match-speciﬁc ability draw. As
more productive ﬁrms screen to higher ability thresholds, only workers with ability draws above those thresholds
receive the higher wages paid by more productive ﬁrms. It follows that both the average wage and wage dispersion
are increasing in a worker’s match-speciﬁc ability draw, as discussed in Helpman et al. (2008a).
16least productive exporter. Note that wd depends on general equilibrium variables only through
search costs (b). The share of workers employed by domestic ﬁrms, Sh,d, can be evaluated using














The distributions of wages across workers employed by domestic and exporting ﬁrms can also
be derived from the solutions for ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables (23). Given that productivity is Pareto
distributed and both wages and employment are power functions of productivity, the distribution









for wd≤ w ≤ wd/ρ
kβ
δΓ. (25)


















The wage distributions for workers employed by domestic ﬁrms and exporters have the same




, where Γ ≡ 1 − βγ −
β
δ
(1 − γk). (27)
For the mean and variance of the sectoral wage distribution to be ﬁnite, we require 0 <μ<1 and
hence zΓ > 2β,w h i c hi ss a t i s ﬁed for suﬃciently large z (a suﬃciently skewed ﬁrm productivity
distribution).23
3.1 Sectoral Wage Inequality in the Closed Economy
The closed economy wage distribution can be obtained by taking the limit ρ → 0 in the open
economy wage distribution (24). In the closed economy, the share of employment in domestic
ﬁrms is equal to one, and the sectoral wage distribution across workers employed by domestic
ﬁrms is an untruncated Pareto distribution with lower limit wd and shape parameter 1+1 /μ.
Given an untruncated Pareto distribution, all scale-invariant measures of inequality, such as
the Coeﬃcient of Variation, the Gini Coeﬃcient and the Theil Index, depend solely on the
distribution’s shape parameter. None of these measures depends on the lower limit of the
23While we concentrate on the wage distribution, as this is typically the subject of the economic debate over
the impact of trade liberalization, the income distribution could also be inﬂuenced by proﬁts. As discussed in
footnote 18, the model can be also used to determine the distribution of revenue (and hence proﬁts) across ﬁrms.
17support of the wage distribution (wd), and they therefore do not depend on search costs (b)o r
expected worker income (ω). While these variables aﬀect the mean of the wage distribution,
they do not aﬀect its dispersion. An important implication of this result is that the model’s
predictions for wage inequality are robust to alternative ways of closing the model in general
equilibrium to determine expected income (ω).
Proposition 1 In the closed economy, μ is a suﬃcient statistic for sectoral wage inequality.
In particular: (i) The Coeﬃcient of Variation of wages is μ/
p
1 − μ2; (ii) The Lorenz Curve
is represented by sw =1− (1 − sh)
1/(1+μ),w h e r esh is the fraction of workers and sw is the
fraction of their wages when workers are ordered from low to high wage earners; (iii) The Gini
Coeﬃcient is μ/(2 + μ); and (iv) The Theil Index is μ − ln(1 + μ).
Proof. See the web-based technical appendix.
Evidently, sectoral wage inequality is monotonically increasing in μ (the lower the shape para-
meter of the wage distribution 1+1 /μ, the greater wage inequality). Using this result, we can
analyze the relationship between sectoral wage inequality and the dispersion of ﬁrm productivity
and worker ability.
Proposition 2 In the closed economy, inequality in the sectoral distribution of wages is increas-
ing in ﬁrm productivity dispersion (lower z), and increasing in worker ability dispersion (lower
k)i fa n do n l yi fz−1 + δ−1 + γ>β −1.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Proposition 1 and the deﬁnition of μ.
Since more productive ﬁrms pay higher wages, greater dispersion in ﬁrm productivity (lower
z) implies greater sectoral wage inequality. In contrast, greater dispersion in worker ability (lower
k) has an ambiguous eﬀect on sectoral wage inequality because of two counteracting forces. On
the one hand, a reduction in k increases relative employment in more productive ﬁrms (from
(23)) that pay higher wages, which increases wage inequality. On the other hand, a reduction
in k decreases relative wages paid by more productive ﬁrms (from (23)), which reduces wage
inequality. When the parameter inequality in the proposition is satisﬁed, the change in relative
employment dominates the change in relative wages, and greater dispersion in worker ability
implies greater sectoral wage inequality. Additionally, the sectoral wage distribution depends
on the other product and labor market parameters that inﬂuence workforce composition. These
include the concavity of revenue (β) and production (γ), and the convexity of screening costs
(δ), as can be seen from the deﬁnition of μ in (27).
The model’s prediction that sectoral wage inequality is closely linked to the dispersion of
ﬁrm productivity receives strong empirical support. In particular, Davis and Haltiwanger (1991)
show that wage dispersion across plants within sectors accounts for a large share of overall wage
dispersion, and is responsible for more than one third of the growth in overall wage dispersion
in U.S. manufacturing between 1975 and 1986. Additionally, they ﬁnd that between-plant wage
18dispersion is strongly related to between-plant size dispersion, which in our model is driven
by productivity dispersion. Similarly, Faggio, Salvanes and Van Reenen (2007) show that a
substantial component of the increase in individual wage inequality in the United Kingdom in
recent decades has occurred between ﬁrms within sectors and is linked to increased productivity
dispersion between ﬁrms within sectors.
While greater ﬁrm productivity dispersion (associated for example with innovations such as
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)) is one potential source of increased wage
inequality in the model, another potential source is international trade as considered in the next
section. Indeed, both greater ﬁrm productivity dispersion and international trade raise wage
inequality through the same mechanism of greater dispersion in ﬁrm revenue and wages within
industries, and both raise measured productivity at the industry level through reallocations of
resources across ﬁrms.
3.2 Open Versus Closed Economy
The sectoral wage distribution in the open economy depends on the suﬃcient statistic for wage
inequality in the closed economy (μ) and the extensive and intensive measures of trade openness
(ρ and Υx, respectively). In the two limiting cases of ρ =0(no ﬁrm exports) and ρ =1(all ﬁrms
export), the open economy wage distribution is an untruncated Pareto with shape parameter
1+1/μ. From Proposition 1, all scale-invariant measures of inequality for an untruncated Pareto
distribution depend solely on the distribution’s shape parameter. Therefore there is the same
level of wage inequality in the open economy when all ﬁrms export as in the closed economy.
To characterize sectoral wage inequality in the open economy when 0 <ρ<1 (only some
ﬁrms export), we compare the actual open economy wage distribution (Gw (w))t oac o u n t e r -
factual wage distribution (Gc
w (w)). For the counterfactual wage distribution, we choose an
untruncated Pareto distribution with the same shape parameter as the wage distribution in the
closed economy (1+1 /μ) but the same mean as the wage distribution in the open economy.
An important feature of this counterfactual wage distribution is that it has the same level of
inequality as the closed economy wage distribution. Therefore, if we show that there is more
inequality with the open economy wage distribution than with the counterfactual wage distrib-
ution, this will imply that there is more wage inequality in the open economy than in the closed
economy.
The counterfactual wage distribution has two other important properties, as shown formally
in the web-based technical appendix. First, the lowest wage in the counterfactual wage distrib-
ution (wc
d) lies strictly in between the lowest wage paid by domestic ﬁrms (wd)a n dt h el o w e s t





) in the actual open economy wage distribution. Otherwise,
the counterfactual wage distribution would have a mean either lower or higher than the actual
open economy wage distribution, which contradicts the requirement that the two distributions
have the same mean. Second, the counterfactual wage distribution has a smaller slope than the




























Figure 2: Cumulative distribution function of wages





, and would therefore have a
higher mean than the actual wage distribution.
Together, these two properties imply that the relative location of the cumulative distribution
functions for actual and counterfactual wages is as shown in Figure 2.24 The actual and coun-
terfactual cumulative distributions intersect only once and the actual distribution lies above the
counterfactual distribution for low wages and below it for high wages.25 This pattern provides a
suﬃcient condition for the counterfactual wage distribution to second-order stochastically dom-
inate the wage distribution in the open economy. Therefore, for all measures of inequality that
respect second-order stochastic dominance, the open economy wage distribution exhibits greater
inequality than the counterfactual wage distribution. It follows that the wage distribution in
the open economy exhibits more inequality than the wage distribution in the closed economy.
This result holds independently of whether the opening of trade aﬀects expected worker income
(ω), because ω aﬀects the lower limit of the actual open economy wage distribution (and hence
the lower limit of the counterfactual wage distribution), but does not aﬀect the comparison of
levels of inequality between the two distributions.
Proposition 3 (i) Sectoral wage inequality in the open economy when some but not all ﬁrms
export is strictly greater than in the closed economy; and (ii) Sectoral wage inequality in the
open economy when all ﬁrms export is the same as in the closed economy.
Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above, as shown formally in the web-based
technical appendix.
24In order to generate Figures 1-3, we set the parameters of the model to match some of the salient features of
the data. For details see Helpman, Redding and Itskhoki (2008b).







, as shown in Figure 2, or below it. In both cases, the actual and counterfactual
distributions have the properties discussed in the text.
20Proposition 3 holds for asymmetric countries and irrespective of which of the model’s para-
meters are the source of the asymmetry across countries. While for simplicity we focus on the
case of two countries, extending the analysis to a world of many countries is straightforward.
The proposition identiﬁes an alternative mechanism for trade to inﬂuence wage inequality from
the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem of traditional trade theory. While the Stolper-Samuelson the-
orem emphasizes reallocations of resources across sectors that change the relative rewards of
skilled and unskilled workers, the changes in wage inequality in Proposition 3 arise from changes
in wages and employment across ﬁrms within sectors. This prediction that the opening of trade
can increase wage inequality for asymmetric countries, the emphasis on reallocation across ﬁrms
within sectors, and the focus on residual wage inequality ﬁnd support in the recent empirical
literature on trade and wage inequality reviewed in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007).
While the opening of closed economies to trade raises wage inequality, it also increases
average wages conditional on being employed (in terms of the numeraire). Under the conditions
discussed in Section 6, expected worker income (ω) is constant in general equilibrium, and hence
so are search costs (b) and the lower limit of the wage distribution (wd). As a result, the discrete
increase in wages at the productivity threshold for exporting implies that the open economy
wage distribution ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the closed economy wage distribution, as
can be seen from (24). To the extent that expected worker income (ω)i si n c r e a s e db yt h e
opening of trade, as discussed in Section 6, this raises the lower limit of the open economy wage
distribution (wd) and further reinforces the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance result.
Since sectoral wage inequality when all ﬁrms export is the same as in the closed economy, but
sectoral wage inequality when only some ﬁrms export is higher than in the closed economy, the
relationship between sectoral wage inequality and the fraction of exporters is non-monotonic.
An increase in the share of ﬁrms that export can either raise or reduce sectoral wage inequality
depending on the initial share of ﬁrms that export (ρz) ,w h i c hi nt u r nd e p e n d so nt h er e l a t i v e
productivity cutoﬀs( ρ). As ρ → 0,n oﬁrm exports, and a small increase in the share of ﬁrms
that export raises sectoral wage inequality, because of the higher wages paid by exporters. As
ρ → 1,a l lﬁrms export, and a small reduction in the share of ﬁrms that export increases sectoral
wage inequality, because of the lower wages paid by domestic ﬁrms. Therefore the model points
to the initial level of trade openness as a relevant control in examining the empirical relationship
between wage inequality and trade openness.
While ﬁxed and variable trade costs (fx and τ, respectively) both inﬂuence sectoral wage
inequality, they do so through slightly diﬀerent mechanisms, because they have diﬀerent eﬀects
on the extensive and intensive margins of trade openness (ρ and Υx, respectively). This can
be seen most clearly for symmetric countries, where the intensive margin depends on variable
trade costs alone (Υx =1+τ
−β
1−β), and changes in the ﬁxed costs of exporting aﬀect only the
extensive margin (ρ). More generally, for asymmetric countries, the intensive margin depends






and variable trade costs aﬀect both margins of trade openness.


























Figure 3: Theil index of sectoral wage inequality
To illustrate the non-monotonic relationship between sectoral wage inequality and trade
openness, Figure 3 graphs the variation in the Theil Index of wage inequality with symmetric
c o u n t r i e sa sw ev a r yt h eﬁxed costs of exporting (fx) and hence the extensive margin of trade
openness (ρ). Similar non-monotonic relationships are observed as we vary variable trade costs
(τ) and for other measures of wage inequality such as the Gini Coeﬃcient.
4S e c t o r a l U n e m p l o y m e n t
The presence of labor market frictions generates equilibrium unemployment. Workers can be
unemployed either because they are not matched with a ﬁrm or because their match-speciﬁc
ability draw is below the screening threshold of the ﬁrm with which they are matched. Therefore
the sectoral unemployment rate u can be expressed as one minus the product of the hiring rate










where σ ≡ H/N, H is the measure of hired workers, N is the measure of matched workers, and
L is the measure of workers seeking employment in the sector.
The sectoral tightness of the labor market (x) in (14) depends on the search friction parameter
(α0) and expected worker income (ω). Therefore the tightness of the labor market is not directly
aﬀected by trade openness and is only indirectly aﬀected in so far as trade openness inﬂuences ω.
While in this section we examine the comparative statics of unemployment for a given value of ω,
in Section 6 we determine its value in general equilibrium. As part of that analysis, we provide
conditions under which ω is unaﬀected by trade openness, and examine how the comparative
statics of unemployment change when it responds to trade openness.
22In contrast, the sectoral hiring rate (σ) depends directly on trade openness, which inﬂuences
ﬁrm revenues and hence screening ability thresholds. Using the Pareto productivity distribution,
the sectoral hiring rate can be expressed as a function of the extensive and intensive margins
of trade openness (ρ and Υx respectively), the suﬃcient statistic for wage inequality (μ), and
other parameters, as shown in the web-based technical appendix:































Evidently, we have ϕ(0,Υx)=1and 0 <ϕ (ρ,Υx) < 1 for 0 <ρ≤ 1,s i n c eΥx > 1 and δ>k .
4.1 Sectoral Unemployment in the Closed Economy
The closed economy hiring rate can be obtained by taking the limit ρ → 0 in (29); it depends
solely on model parameters for a given value of expected worker income (ω). The hiring rate
depends on the screening cost (c) but not on the search friction parameter (α0), and it depends on
both the dispersion of ﬁrm productivity (z) and the dispersion of worker ability (k). Combining
the closed economy hiring rate (σ)f r o m( 2 9 )w i t hl a b o rm a r k e tt i g h t n e s s( x) from (14), we can
examine the determinants of the sectoral unemployment rate (u). This yields
Proposition 4 Let ω be constant. Then the closed economy sectoral unemployment rate u is
increasing in the search friction α0, decreasing in the screening cost c, increasing in the dispersion
of ﬁrm productivity (lower z), and can be either increasing or decreasing in the dispersion of
worker ability (lower k).
Proof. The proof follows immediately from equations, (14), (27), (28) and (29).
It is clear from this proposition that search and screening costs have quite diﬀerent eﬀects
on sectoral unemployment. As the search cost (b) rises in response to a rise in α0, the sectoral
tightness of the labor market (x) falls, which increases the sectoral unemployment rate. In
contrast, as the screening cost (c)i n c r e a s e s ,ﬁrms screen less intensively, which increases the
sectoral hiring rate (σ), and thereby reduces the sectoral unemployment rate.
It is also clear that dispersion of ﬁrm productivity has a diﬀerent eﬀect on sectoral un-
employment from the dispersion of worker ability. Since more productive ﬁrms screen more
intensively, an increase in the dispersion of ﬁrm productivity (lower z) reduces the sectoral hir-
ing rate (σ), which increases sectoral unemployment. In contrast, an increase in the dispersion
23of worker ability (lower k) has an ambiguous eﬀect on the sectoral hiring rate (σ) and hence
on the sectoral unemployment rate. On the one hand, more dispersion in worker ability in-
creases the probability of being hired conditional on being sampled ([amin/ac(θ)]
k)f o rag i v e n
screening threshold (ac (θ) >a min), which reduces sectoral unemployment. On the other hand,
more dispersion in worker ability induces ﬁrms to screen more intensively (lower k raises ac (θ)
from (23)), which increases sectoral unemployment.26 Like sectoral wage inequality, the sectoral
unemployment rate also depends on other product and labor market parameters that inﬂuence
workforce composition (β, γ and δ, which enter Γ and μ).
4.2 Open Versus Closed Economy
For a given value of expected worker income (ω), the opening of trade only aﬀects the sectoral
u n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e( u) through the hiring rate (σ). Furthermore, the open economy hiring rate
(29) equals the closed economy hiring rate times the fraction ϕ(ρ,Υx), which depends on both
the extensive and intensive margins of trade openness. This fraction is strictly less than one in
an equilibrium where some ﬁrms export (0 <ρ≤ 1), and hence the sectoral hiring rate (σ)i s
strictly lower in the open economy than in the closed economy. We therefore have
Proposition 5 Let ω be invariant to trade. Then the sectoral unemployment rate u is strictly
higher in the open economy than in the closed economy.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from equation (29).
The opening of trade results in an expansion in the revenue of exporters and a contraction in
the revenue of non-exporters, which changes industry composition towards more productive ﬁrms
that screen more intensively, and thereby increases sectoral unemployment. While the sectoral
unemployment rate is higher in the open economy than in the closed economy, once the econ-
omy is open to trade, the relationship between sectoral unemployment and trade openness (like
the relationship between sectoral wage inequality and trade openness) can be non-monotonic.
In particular, the sectoral unemployment rate can be either monotonically decreasing in trade
openness, or it can exhibit an inverted U-shape, where sectoral unemployment is initially in-
creasing in trade openness before decreasing in trade openness, as discussed further in Helpman
et al. (2008b).
As our analysis in this section considers the case where ω i si n v a r i a n tt ot r a d e ,i tf o c u s e ss o l e l y
on changes in unemployment due to changes in ﬁrms’ screening policies (σ). In our analysis of
general equilibrium in Section 6 below, we show that the opening of trade can also aﬀect ω and
have oﬀsetting eﬀects on unemployment through labor market tightness (x).
26There is an additional compositional eﬀect of greater dispersion in worker ability. From (23), lower k increases
n(θ) for all ﬁrms, but has a larger eﬀect for more productive ﬁrms. Since more productive ﬁrms screen more
intensively, this change in sectoral composition increases sectoral unemployment.
245 Sectoral Income Inequality
The sectoral distribution of income depends on both the sectoral distribution of wages and the
unemployment rate, where unemployed workers all receive the same income of zero. Since there
is greater wage inequality and a higher unemployment rate in the open economy than in the
closed economy, it follows that there is also greater income inequality. As shown in the web-
based technical appendix, the Theil Index of income inequality (Tι) can be expressed as the
following function of the Theil Index of wage inequality (Tw) and the unemployment rate (u),
Tι = Tw − ln(1 − u). (30)
A similar result holds for the Gini Coeﬃcient of income inequality (Gι), which can be expressed
in terms of the Gini Coeﬃcient of wage inequality (Gw) and the unemployment rate:27
Gι =( 1− u)Gw + u. (31)
5.1 Sectoral Income Inequality in the Closed Economy
The comparative statics for sectoral income inequality in the closed economy follow from those
for sectoral wage inequality and unemployment above.
Proposition 6 Let ω be constant. In the closed economy sectoral income inequality, as measured
by either the Theil Index or the Gini Coeﬃcient, is increasing in the search friction α0,d e c r e a s i n g
in the screening cost c, increasing in the dispersion of ﬁrm productivity (lower z), and can be
either increasing or decreasing in the dispersion of worker ability (lower k).
Proof. The proposition follows immediately from Propositions 2 and 4 and the expressions
for the Theil Index (30) and Gini Coeﬃcient (31).
While a rise in the search friction α0 (which raises the search cost b) or a reduction in the
screening cost (c) leaves sectoral wage inequality unchanged, it raises sectoral unemployment
and hence increases sectoral income inequality. On the other hand, a rise in the dispersion
of ﬁrm productivity (lower z) increases sectoral income inequality through both higher wage
inequality and higher unemployment. In contrast, a rise in the dispersion of worker ability (lower
k) has an ambiguous eﬀect on sectoral wage inequality, unemployment and income inequality.
Furthermore, greater dispersion of worker ability can raise sectoral wage inequality while at
the same time reducing sectoral income inequality (and vice versa) as shown in Helpman et al.
(2008a), so that conclusions based on wage inequality can be misleading if the ultimate concern
is income inequality.
27The Theil Index of inequality allows an exact decomposition of overall inequality into within and between-
group inequality (Bourguignon 1979), where the groups are here employed and unemployed workers. In general,
the Gini Coeﬃcient does not allow such a decomposition, but in the present case all unemployed workers receive
the same income of zero, which is strictly less than the lowest income of an employed worker. Therefore, a similar
decomposition can be undertaken for the Gini Coeﬃcient, as shown in the web-based technical appendix.
255.2 Open Versus Closed Economy
The eﬀect of the opening of trade on sectoral income inequality also follows from its eﬀects on
sectoral wage inequality and unemployment above.
Proposition 7 Let ω be invariant to trade. Then sectoral income inequality, as measured by the
Theil Index or the Gini Coeﬃcient, is higher in the open economy than in the closed economy.
Proof. The proposition follows immediately from Propositions 3 and 5 and the expressions
for the Theil Index (30) and Gini Coeﬃcient (31).
The opening of trade raises sectoral income inequality through two channels. First, the
partitioning of ﬁrms by productivity into exporters and non-exporters, and the discrete increase
in wages at exporters relative to non-exporters, raises sectoral wage inequality. Second, the
reallocation of employment towards more productive ﬁrms that screen more intensively reduces
the hiring rate and increases sectoral unemployment.
While sectoral income inequality in the open economy is higher than in the closed economy,
once the economy is open to trade, sectoral income inequality (like wage inequality and unem-
ployment) has a non-monotonic relationship with trade openness. Therefore a further increase
in trade openness can either increase or decrease sectoral income inequality depending on the
initial level of trade openness.
6 General Equilibrium
Up to this point, we have analyzed sectoral equilibrium in the closed and open economy, taking
as given expected worker income (ω), prices in other sectors (P−i) and aggregate income (Ω).
In this section, we examine the determination of these variables in general equilibrium and the
relationship between them.
We begin by assuming that workers are risk neutral and consider two alternative ways of
closing the model in general equilibrium. First, we introduce an outside good, which is homo-
geneous and produced without search frictions. This approach is particularly tractable, as with
risk neutrality expected income in the diﬀerentiated sector is pinned down by the wage in the
outside sector when both goods are produced. Therefore expected worker income is invariant to
the opening of trade in equilibria where both goods are produced.28 Second, we consider a sin-
gle diﬀerentiated sector and solve for endogenous expected worker income. While endogenizing
expected worker income complicates the determination of general equilibrium, all of our results
for sectoral wage inequality are unchanged, and we obtain a new general equilibrium eﬀect for
unemployment, since labor market tightness responds endogenously to the opening of trade.
28While we assume no search frictions in the outside sector, Helpman and Itskhoki (2009) show in a model
without worker heterogeneity or screening that introducing search frictions in the outside sector generates an
expected income ω0 that is independent of features of the diﬀerentiated sector. Augmenting the model here to
incorporate search frictions in the outside sector would generate a similar result.
26Closing the model in general equilibrium also enables us to examine the eﬀect of the opening
of trade on workers’ ex ante expected and ex post welfare. In the ﬁrst two sub-sections, we
characterize these eﬀects under risk neutrality. In a ﬁnal sub-section, we introduce risk aversion,
which enables us to address the issue of globalization and income risk. We show that risk
aversion introduces a new general equilibrium eﬀect, which works against the expected welfare
gains from the increase in average productivity induced by the opening of trade.
Individual workers in the diﬀerentiated sector experience idiosyncratic income risk as a result
of the positive probability of unemployment and wage dispersion. In each of the alternative ways
of closing the model, we assume that preferences are deﬁned over an aggregate consumption index
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where P is the price index of the aggregate consumption measure C.
6.1 Outside Sector and Risk Neutrality
We begin closing the model using an outside sector under the assumption of risk neutrality
(η =0 ). The aggregate consumption index (C)i sd e ﬁned over consumption of a homogeneous
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where Q is modelled as in Section 2 above, and ϑ determines the relative weight of the homo-
geneous and diﬀerentiated sectors in consumer preferences.29 While for simplicity we consider
as i n g l ed i ﬀerentiated sector, the analysis generalizes in a straightforward way to the case of
multiple diﬀerentiated sectors.
In the homogeneous sector, the product market is perfectly competitive and there are no
labor market frictions. In this sector, one unit of labor is required to produce one unit of output
and there are no trade costs. Therefore, as we choose the homogeneous good as the numeraire
(p0 =1 ), the wage in this sector is equal to one in both countries.
To determine expected worker income in the diﬀerentiated sector, we use an indiﬀerence
condition between sectors analogous to that in Harris and Todaro (1970), which equates the
expected utility of entering each sector in an equilibrium where both goods are produced. Un-
29While in the analysis here we assume that workers have CRRA-CES preferences and experience income risk,
Helpman et al. (2008a,b) consider an alternative speciﬁcation with quasi-linear preferences and income insurance
within families.
27der risk neutrality, this Harris-Todaro condition implies that expected worker income in the
diﬀerentiated sector equals the certain wage of one in the homogeneous sector (see (13)):
xb = ω =1 , (33)
where incomplete specialization can be ensured by appropriate choice of labor endowments
(¯ L, ¯ L∗) and relative preferences for the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods (ϑ). Positive
unemployment occurs in the diﬀerentiated sector for a suﬃciently large search friction α0,s u c h
that α0 >ω=1and hence 0 <x<1 in (14).
Given a certain wage of one in the outside sector and a positive probability of unemployment
in the diﬀerentiated sector, worker indiﬀerence across sectors requires the average wage in the
diﬀerentiated sector to be strictly greater than one. As a result, in this ﬁrst speciﬁcation of the
model, there is a positive relationship across sectors between the unemployment rate and the
average wage.30 In contrast, in the second speciﬁcation of the model with a single diﬀerentiated
sector considered below, expected worker income is endogenous. Therefore, changes in parame-
ters can induce either a positive or negative relationship between changes in the unemployment
rate and average wage within the diﬀerentiated sector, because expected worker income (one
minus the unemployment rate times the average wage) is no longer constant.
Given an expected income of one in each sector, each country’s aggregate income is equal to
its labor endowment:
Ω = ¯ L. (34)
To determine the price index in the diﬀerentiated sector (P), we use the functional rela-
tionship (19) introduced above, which with CES preferences between the homogeneous and











where the right-hand side is monotonically increasing in P. Therefore this relationship uniquely
pins down P given the demand shifter (A) and aggregate income (Ω).
To determine general equilibrium, we use the conditions for sectoral equilibrium in Section
2 above (where (35) replaces (19)), and combine them with the Harris-Todaro condition (33)
and aggregate income (34). Together these relationships determine the equilibrium vector (x,
b, θd, θx, A, Q, P, M, L, ω, Ω). Having determined this equilibrium vector, the price index
P–dual to the aggregate consumption index C–and consumption of the homogeneous good q0
follow from CES demand. Finally, equilibrium employment in the homogeneous sector follows
from labor market clearing (L0 = ¯ L − L, where incomplete specialization requires L<¯ L).
30This feature follows from our assumption that worker ability is match-speciﬁc and hence unknown prior to
entering a sector. Extending the model to allow for additional worker characteristics that are known prior to
entering a sector would aﬀect this result if workers with diﬀerent known characteristics sort non-randomly across
sectors and diﬀer in terms of their unemployment rate and average wage.
28Having characterized general equilibrium, we are now in a position to examine the impact of
the opening of trade on ex ante expected and ex post welfare. To characterize the impact on ex
ante welfare, note that diﬀerentiated sector workers receive the same expected indirect utility




for η =0 .( 3 6 )
Therefore the change in expected welfare as a result of the opening of trade depends solely on
the change in the aggregate price index (P), which with our choice of numeraire depends solely
on the change in the price index for the diﬀerentiated sector (P). These comparative statics are
straightforward to determine. From the free entry condition (18), the opening of trade raises the
zero-proﬁt productivity cutoﬀ (θd). Using the Harris-Todaro condition (33) and labor market
tightness (14), search costs (b) remain constant as long as both goods are produced, because
expected worker income equals one. Therefore, from the zero-proﬁtc u t o ﬀ condition (15), the
rise in θd implies a lower value of the demand shifter (A). Given constant aggregate income (Ω)
and a lower value of A, CES demand (35) implies that the opening of trade reduces the price
index for the diﬀerentiated sector (P), which implies higher expected welfare in the open than
in the closed economy.
While ex ante welfare is the same for all workers, the opening of trade has distributional
consequences for ex post welfare. In the homogeneous sector, there is no uncertainty, and ex
post and ex ante welfare are the same. In contrast, in the diﬀerentiated sector, the opening of
trade raises the zero-proﬁt productivity cutoﬀ (θd) and induces selection into export markets
(θx >θ d), which from the solutions for ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables (23) implies higher wages in
exporting ﬁrms and lower wages in domestic ﬁrms (in terms of the numeraire). Additionally,
there is a higher unemployment rate in the diﬀerentiated sector in the open economy than in the
closed economy, since expected worker income (ω) is invariant to the opening of trade as long
as both goods are produced. To the extent that there are workers who are unemployed in the
open economy, but would be employed in the closed economy, these workers experience lower
income in the open economy than in the closed economy. Using these results for the incomes of
employees of exporters, employees of domestic ﬁrms and the unemployed, as well as the lower
aggregate price index in the open economy established above, we can compare welfare in the
open and closed economies as follows:
Proposition 8 Let η =0 . Then (i) Every worker’s ex ante welfare is higher in the open
economy than in the closed economy; (ii) A homogeneous sector worker’s ex post welfare is
higher in the open economy than in the closed economy; (iii) In the diﬀerentiated sector: (a)
The ex post welfare of a worker employed by an exporting ﬁrm with productivity θ is higher
in the open economy than in the closed economy; (b) The ex post welfare of workers who are
unemployed in the open economy, but who would be employed in the closed economy, is lower
than in the closed economy; (c) The ex post welfare of a worker employed by a domestic non-
29exporting ﬁrm with productivity θ can be either higher or lower in the open economy than in the
closed economy.
Proof. The proposition follows from the indirect utility function, the free entry condition
(18), the zero-proﬁtc u t o ﬀ condition (15), and CES demand (35), as shown in the web-based
technical appendix.
As there is no unemployment or income inequality in the outside sector, aggregate unem-
ployment and income inequality depend on the diﬀerentiated sector’s share of the labor force
as well as unemployment and income inequality within this sector. As a result, the opening of
trade has additional compositional eﬀects on aggregate unemployment (as discussed in Helpman
and Itskhoki 2009) and aggregate income inequality (as discussed in Helpman et al. 2008a,b).
6.2 Single Diﬀerentiated Sector and Risk Neutrality
We next consider a single diﬀerentiated sector under the assumption of risk neutrality (η =0 ).
The aggregate consumption index (C)i sd e ﬁned over consumption of a continuum of horizontally
diﬀerentiated varieties:
C = Q,
where Q again takes the same form as in Section 2 above. While for simplicity we again assume
as i n g l ed i ﬀerentiated sector, the analysis generalizes in a straightforward way to the case of
multiple diﬀerentiated sectors.
General equilibrium can be determined in the same way as sectoral equilibrium in Section
2, while also solving for expected worker income (ω) and aggregate income (Ω). We choose the
dual price index (P) in one country as the numeraire, and assume for simplicity throughout
this sub-section that countries are symmetric, which implies P = P∗ =1 . Having normalized
P, the diﬀerentiated sector’s real consumption index (Q) follows immediately from the demand
shifter (A)i n( 2 0 ) :Q = A1/(1−β). To determine expected worker income (ω), we combine the
zero-proﬁtc u t o ﬀ condition (15), the search technology (12) and expected worker income (13),























A second upward-sloping relationship between Q and ω is provided by equilibrium labor pay-







where we have used labor market clearing: L = ¯ L.
Having determined the zero-proﬁt productivity cutoﬀ (θd)f r o mt h eﬁrst bloc of equations
(15), (16) and (18), the two equations (37) and (38) can be solved in closed form for Q and
30ω. Having solved for ω, aggregate income is given by Ω = ω¯ L, and all remaining endogenous
variables of the model can be solved for in closed form, as shown in the web-based technical
appendix.31
Under the assumption of risk neutrality, and noting P = P∗ =1 , ex ante expected welfare
equals expected income (ω), which is now endogenous and responds to the opening of trade. We
are therefore in a position to determine the comparative statics of opening closed economies to
trade.
Proposition 9 Let η =0 . Then in the one-sector economy the opening of trade: (i) Increases
expected worker income (ω) and hence expected welfare; (ii) Increases labor market tightness (x)
a n ds e a r c hc o s t s( b).
Proof. See the web-based technical appendix for the formal derivation of these results.
The predictions of the model without the outside sector are similar to those of the model with
the outside sector. The opening of trade increases ex ante expected welfare and has distributional
consequences for ex post welfare depending on whether workers are employed or unemployed
and depending on whether they are employed by exporters or domestic ﬁrms. One new general
equilibrium eﬀect is that the increase in average productivity in the diﬀerentiated sector following
the opening of trade increases expected worker income (ω), which in turn increases the tightness
of the labor market (x), and hence raises equilibrium search costs (b).
The model’s predictions for sectoral wage inequality do not depend on expected worker
income (ω)a n ds e a r c hc o s t s( b), and are therefore the same with or without the outside sector.
In contrast, the endogenous determination of expected worker income (ω) opens up a new
channel for trade to aﬀect sectoral unemployment (28). As shown in Section 2, the opening of
closed economies to trade raises sectoral unemployment for a given value of expected worker
income (ω), because it reduces the hiring rate (σ). In the model without the outside sector, the
opening of trade now also increases expected worker income (ω). This “income eﬀect” reduces
sectoral unemployment through increased labor market tightness (x). Depending on parameter
values, this increase in labor market tightness can dominate the reduction in the hiring rate,
so that sectoral unemployment can fall rather than rise following the opening of trade. Finally,
in the model with a single diﬀerentiated sector, there are no changes in sectoral composition,
so that our results for sectoral inequality and unemployment extend immediately to aggregate
inequality and unemployment.
6.3 Outside Sector and Risk Aversion
To introduce risk aversion (0 <η<1), we return to the model with the outside sector, where we
can explore the implications of uncertainty for the allocation of resources between the riskless





which is satisﬁed for suﬃciently convex search costs (suﬃciently high α1)a n ds u ﬃciently high elasticities of
substitution between varieties (β suﬃciently close to but less than one).
31homogeneous sector and risky diﬀerentiated sector.32 Introducing risk aversion changes the
equilibrium share of revenue received by workers in the bargaining game, but does not aﬀect
any of the comparative statics of sectoral equilibrium considered above.33 General equilibrium
can be determined in the same way as in Section 6.1, but with appropriate modiﬁcations for
risk aversion to the Harris-Todaro condition (33) and aggregate income (34).
Under the assumption of risk aversion, the Harris-Todaro condition equates expected utility
in the diﬀerentiated sector to the certain wage of one in the homogeneous sector, and therefore




w1−ηdGw (w)=1 , (39)
where expected utility in the diﬀerentiated sector equals the probability of being matched (x)
times the probability of being hired conditional on being matched (σ) times expected utility
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Evidently, we have Λ(0,Υx)=1and 0 < Λ(ρ,Υx) < 1 for 0 <ρ≤ 1,s i n c eΥx > 1, δ>kand
0 <η<1.
There is income risk in the diﬀerentiated sector, because of unemployment and wage in-
equality, which imply that risk averse workers require a risk premium to enter this sector. To











where a suﬃciently large search friction (α0) ensures positive unemployment (0 <x<1 in (14))
and a positive risk premium in the diﬀerentiated sector (ω − 1 > 0). Aggregate income is the
32I n t r o d u c i n gr i s ka v e r s i o ni nt h em o d e lw i t has i n g l ed i ﬀerentiated sector has little eﬀect, because there is no
riskless activity to or from which resources can move.
33In the web-based technical appendix, we derive the solution to the Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) bargaining
game when workers are risk averse. We show that with CRRA-CES preferences the solution takes a similar form
as when there are diﬀerences in bargaining weight between the ﬁrm and its workers.
34T h et e r m si nt h ep r i c ei n d e x( P)a n d1/(1 − η) cancel from the Harris-Todaro condition equating expected
indirect uility (32) in the two sectors.
32sum of worker income in the homogeneous sector and the diﬀerentiated sector:
Ω = ¯ L +( ω − 1)L. (42)
As shown in the analysis of sectoral equilibrium in Sections 2—4 above, the opening of trade
increases sectoral wage inequality and unemployment for a given value of ω. This increase in wage
inequality and unemployment enhances income risk in the diﬀerentiated sector, which implies
that risk averse workers require a higher risk premium to enter the diﬀerentiated sector. This
“risk eﬀect” raises expected worker income (ω) following the opening of trade (since Λ(0,Υx)=1
and 0 < Λ(ρ,Υx) < 1 for 0 <ρ≤ 1 in (41)), which increases labor market tightness (x)a n d
search costs (b). We are now in a position to state the following comparative statics for the
opening of closed economies to trade.
Proposition 10 Let 0 <η<1. Then the opening of trade: (i) Increases expected worker
income (ω); (ii) Increases labor market tightness (x) and search costs (b).
Proof. The proposition follows from the free entry condition (18), expected worker income
(41) and labor market tightness (14), as shown in the web-based technical appendix.
Under risk aversion, the opening of trade has two counteracting eﬀects on expected welfare.
On the one hand, it raises the zero-proﬁt productivity cutoﬀ, which increases average productiv-
ity, expands the size of the diﬀerentiated sector and reduces the diﬀerentiated sector price index.
On the other hand, it increases the risk premium in the diﬀerentiated sector, which increases
search costs, contracts the size of the diﬀerentiated sector and increases the diﬀerentiated sector
price index. In addition, there are distributional consequences of the opening of trade for ex
post welfare depending on a worker’s sector and ﬁrm of employment, as discussed in the case of
risk neutrality above.
The predictions for sectoral wage inequality are unchanged by the introduction of risk aver-
sion, because they do not depend on expected worker income (ω). In contrast, as in the model
without the outside sector, the increase in expected worker income as a result of the opening
of trade modiﬁes the predictions for sectoral unemployment. While the reduction in the hiring
rate (σ) established in Section 2 above increases unemployment, the increase in labor market
tightness (x) induced by higher expected worker income reduces unemployment. As in the risk
neutral case discussed above, aggregate inequality and unemployment depend on their sectoral
values and sectoral composition.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The relationship between international trade and earnings inequality is one of the most hotly-
debated issues in economics. Traditionally, research has approached this topic from the perspec-
tive of neoclassical trade theory with its emphasis on specialization across industries and changes
33in the relative rewards of skilled and unskilled labor. In this paper we propose a new framework
that features variation in employment, wages and workforce composition across ﬁrms within
industries, and equilibrium unemployment. These features are explained by ﬁrm heterogeneity,
worker heterogeneity, search frictions and screening of workers by ﬁrms.
We characterize the distribution of wages across workers and the determinants of unemploy-
ment. In the closed economy, there is a single suﬃcient statistic for wage inequality, which is
increasing in the dispersion of ﬁrm productivity, and can be either increasing or decreasing in
the dispersion of worker ability. Opening closed economies to trade raises wage inequality, but
once economies are open to trade, further increases in trade openness can either raise or reduce
wage inequality. The unemployment rate depends on the fraction of workers that are matched
(the tightness of the labor market) and the fraction of these matched workers that are hired
(the hiring rate). While opening closed economies to trade reduces the hiring rate, it leaves la-
bor market tightness unchanged except for general equilibrium eﬀects through expected worker
income. We provide conditions under which expected income remains constant in general equi-
librium, in which case the opening of closed economies to trade raises income inequality through
both greater wage inequality and higher unemployment.
Since trade aﬀects wage inequality and unemployment, it inﬂuences both ex ante expected
welfare and ex post welfare once ﬁrms and workers are matched. When workers are risk-neutral,
welfare gains from trade are ensured. When workers are risk averse, the reduction in the con-
sumer price index as a result of the productivity gains induced by the opening of trade is
counterbalanced by greater income risk in the diﬀerentiated sector. As compensation for this
greater income risk, workers receive higher expected income in the open economy than in the
closed economy, which increases labor market tightness. As a result, the increase in unemploy-
ment from a lower hiring rate is oﬀset by a reduction in unemployment from a tighter labor
market.
Our model provides a framework which can be used to analyze the complex interplay between
wage inequality, unemployment and income risk, and their relation to international trade. In
emphasizing wage inequality across ﬁrms within industries, it is compatible with trade-related
changes in income inequality, even in the absence of large observed reallocations of resources
across sectors.
34References
[1] Abowd, John M., Robert H. Creecy and Francis Kramarz (2002) “Computing Person and
Firm Eﬀects Using Linked Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data,” Cornell University,
mimeograph.
[2] Abowd, John M. and Francis Kramarz (1999) “The Analysis of Labor Markets using
Matched Employer-Employee Data,” Chapter 40 in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card
(eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3B, 2629-2709.
[3] Abowd, John M., Francis Kramarz and David N. Margolis (1999) “High Wage Workers and
High Wage Firms,” Econometrica, 67, 251-333.
[4] Acemoglu, Daron (1999) “Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality; An Alternative
Theory and Some Evidence,” American Economic Review 89, 1259-1278.
[5] Acemoglu, Daron and Robert Shimer (1999) “Eﬃcient Unemployment Insurance,” Journal
of Political Economy 107, 893-928.
[6] Acemoglu, Daron, Pol Antràs and Elhanan Helpman (2007) “Contracts and Technology
Adoption,” American Economic Review 97, 916-943.
[7] Albrecht, James and Susan Vroman (2002) “A Matching Model with Endogenous Skill
Requirements,” International Economic Review, 43, 282-305.
[8] Altonji, Joseph G. and Charles R. Pierret (2001) “Employer Learning and Statistical Dis-
crimination,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 313-350.
[9] Amiti, Mary and Donald R. Davis (2008) “Trade, Firms, and Wages: Theory and Evidence,”
NBER Working Paper, 14106.
[10] Antràs, Pol and Elhanan Helpman (2004) “Global Sourcing,” Journal of Political Economy,
112(3), 552-580.
[11] Attanasio, Orazio, Pinelopi Goldberg and Nina Pavcnik (2004) “Trade Reforms and Wage
Inequality in Colombia,” Journal of Development Economics, 74, 331-366.
[12] Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz and Melissa Schettini Kearney (2008) “Trends in U.S.
Wage Inequality: Re-assessing the Revisionists,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2),
300 — 323.
[13] Autor, David H. and Scarborough, David (2007) “Does Job Testing Harm Minority Work-
ers? Evidence from Retail Establishments,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
[14] Axtell, Robert L. (2001) “Zipf Distribution of U.S. Firm Sizes,” Science, 293, 1818-1820.
35[15] Barron, John M., John Bishop and William C. Dunkelberg (1985) “Employer Search: The
Interviewing and Hiring of New Employees,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 67, 43-52.
[16] Barron, John M., Dan Black and Mark Loewenstein (1987) “Employer Size: The Implica-
tions for Search, Training, Capital Investment, Starting Wages, and Wage Growth,” Journal
of Labor Economics, 5(1), 76-89.
[17] Bernard, Andrew B. and J. Bradford Jensen (1995) “Exporters, Jobs, and Wages in US
Manufacturing: 1976-87,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 67-
112.
[18] Bernard, Andrew B. and J. Bradford Jensen (1997) “Exporters, Skill Upgrading and the
Wage Gap,” Journal of International Economics, 42, 3-31.
[19] Bernard, Andrew B., Jonathan Eaton, J. Bradford Jensen, and Samuel S. Kortum (2003)
“Plants and Productivity in International Trade,” American Economic Review, 93, 1268-
1290.
[20] Bernard, Andrew B., Stephen J. Redding and Peter K. Schott (2007) “Comparative Ad-
vantage and Heterogeneous Firms,” Review of Economic Studies, 74, 31-66.
[21] Blanchard, Olivier and Jordi Gali (2008) “Labor Markets and Monetary Policy: A New-
Keynesian Model with Unemployment,” NBER Working Paper, 13897.
[22] Bourguignon, Francois (1979) “Decomposable Income Inequality Measures,” Econometrica,
47, 901-920.
[23] Burdett, Kenneth and Dale Mortensen (1998) “Wage Diﬀerentials, Employer Size and Un-
employment,” International Economic Review, 39(2), 257-273.
[24] Cahuc, Pierre, Fabien Postel-Vinay and Jean-Marc Robin (2006) “Wage Bargaining with
On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence, Econometrica, 74(2), 323-364.
[25] Costinot, Arnaud and Jonathan Vogel (2009) “Matching and Inequality in the World Econ-
omy,” MIT, mimeograph.
[26] Davidson, Carl, Lawrence Martin and Steven Matusz (1988) “The Structure of Simple
General Equilibrium Models with Frictional Unemployment,” Journal of Political Economy,
96, 1267-1293.
[27] Davidson, Carl, Lawrence Martin and Steven Matusz (1999) “Trade and Search Generated
Unemployment,” Journal of International Economics, 48, 271-299.
[28] Davidson, Carl, Steven Matusz and Andrei Shevchenko (2008) “Globalization and Firm-
level Adjustment with Imperfect Labor Markets,” Journal of International Economics, 75,
295-309.
36[29] Davis, Steve J. and John Haltiwanger (1991) “Wage Dispersion Between and Within US
Manufacturing Plants, 1963-86,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics,
115-200.
[30] Davis, Donald and James Harrigan (2007) “Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, and Trade Liberaliza-
tion,” NBER Working Paper, 13139.
[31] De Melo, Rafael Lopes (2008) “Sorting in the Labor Market: Theory and Measurement,”
Yale University, mimeograph.
[32] Diamond, Peter A. (1982a) “Demand Management in Search Equilibrium,” Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 90, 881—894.
[33] Diamond, Peter A. (1982b) “Wage Determination and Eﬃciency in Search Equilibrium,”
Review of Economic Studies, 49, 217—227.
[34] Egger, Harmut and Udo Kreickemeier (2007) “Firm Heterogeneity and the Labour Market
Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization,” forthcoming in the International Economic Review.
[35] Egger, Harmut and Udo Kreickemeier (2008) “Fairness, Trade, and Inequality,” mimeo.
[36] Faggio, Giulia, Kjell G. Salvanes and John Van Reenen (2007) “The Evolution of Inequality
in Productivity and Wages: Panel Data Evidence,” CEPR Discussion Paper No 821.
[37] Felbermayr, Gabriel, Julian Prat and Hans-Jörg Schmerer (2008) “Globalization and La-
bor Market Outcomes: Wage Bargaining, Search Frictions and Firm Heterogeneity,” IZA
Discussion Paper, 3363.
[38] Felbermayr, Gabriel, Mario Larch and Wolfgang Lechthaler (2009) “Unemployment in an
Interdependent World,” University of Stuttgart-Hohenheim, mimeograph.
[39] Garicano, Luis (2000) “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production,”
Journal of Political Economy, 108, 874-904.
[40] Goldberg, Penny and Nina Pavcnik (2007) “Distributional Eﬀects of Globalization in De-
veloping Countries,” Journal of Economic Literature, 45(1), 39-82.
[41] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (2008) “Fair Wages and Foreign Sourcing,” in
Elhanan Helpman, Dalia Marin and Thierry Verdier (eds.), The Organization of Firms in
aG l o b a lE c o n o m y ,C a m b r i d g e ,M A :H a r v a r dU n i v e r s i t yP r e s s .
[42] Harris J. and M. Todaro (1970) “Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-
Sector Analysis,” American Economic Review, 60, 126-142.
[43] Heckman, J. J., and B. E. Honore (1990) “The Empirical Content of the Roy Model,”
Econometrica, 58(5), 1121—1149.
37[44] Helpman, Elhanan and Oleg Itskhoki (2009) “Labor Market Rigidities, Trade and Unem-
ployment,”Harvard University, mimeo.
[45] Helpman, Elhanan, Oleg Itskhoki and Stephen J. Redding (2008a) “Wages, Unemployment
and Inequality with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers,” NBER Working Paper 14122.
[46] Helpman, Elhanan, Oleg Itskhoki and Stephen J. Redding (2008b) “Inequality and Unem-
ployment in a Global Economy," NBER Working paper 14478.
[47] Helpman, Elhanan, Marc J. Melitz and Stephen R. Yeaple (2004) “Export Versus FDI with
Heterogeneous Firms,” American Economic Review, 94, 300-316.
[48] Kaplan, David and Eric Verhoogen (2006) “Exporting and Individual Wage Premia: Evi-
dence from Mexican Employer-Employee Data,” Columbia University, mimeograph.
[49] Legros, P and A. F. Newman (2007) “Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative
Matching with Nontransferabilities,” Econometrica, 75(4), 1073—1102.
[50] Lemieux, Thomas (2006) “Increasing Residual Wage Inequality: Composition Eﬀects, Noisy
Data or Rising Skill Returns?”, American Economic Review, 96, 461-98.
[51] Lentz, Rasmus (2007) “Sorting in a General Equilibrium On-the-Job Search Model,” Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison, mimeograph.
[52] Lucas, Robert E. Jr. (1978) “On the Size Distribution of Business Firms,” Bell Journal of
Economics, 9, 508-23.
[53] Melitz, Marc J. (2003) “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate
Industry Productivity,” Econometrica, 71, 1695-1725.
[54] Melitz, Marc J. and Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano (2008) “Market Size, Trade, and Produc-
tivity,” Review of Economic Studies, 75, 295-316.
[55] Menezes-Filho, Naercio Aquino, Marc-Andreas Muendler and Gary Ramey (2008) “The
Structure of Worker Compensation in Brazil, with a Comparison to France and the United
States,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2), 324-346.
[56] Moen, Espen R. (1997) “Competitive Search Equilibrium,” Journal of Political Economy,
105(2), 385-411.
[57] Moretti, Enrico (2004) “Workers’ Education, Spillovers and Productivity: Evidence from
Plant-Level Production Functions,” American Economic Review, 94, 656-690.
[58] Mortensen, Dale T. (1970) “A Theory of Wage and Employment Dynamics,” in (eds.) E. S.
Phelps et al., The Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inﬂation Theory, New
York: Norton.
38[59] Mortensen, Dale T. (2003) Wage Dispersion: Why are Similar Workers Paid Diﬀerently?
Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
[60] Mortensen, Dale T. and Christopher A. Pissarides (1994) “Job Creation and Job Destruc-
tion in the Theory of Unemployment,” Review of Economic Studies, 61, 397-415.
[61] Mortensen, Dale T. and Randall Wright (2002) “Competitive Pricing and Eﬃciency in
Search Equilibrium,” International Economic Review, 43(1), 1-20.
[62] Munch, Jakob Roland and Jan Rose Skaksen (2008) “Human Capital and Wages in Ex-
porting Firms,” Journal of International Economics, 75, 363-372.
[63] Ohnsorge, Franziska and Daniel Treﬂer (2007) “Sorting It Out: International Trade with
Heterogeneous Workers,” Journal of Political Economy, 115, 868-892.
[64] Oi, Walter Y. and Todd L. Idson (1999) “Firm size and wages,” Chapter 33 in O. Ashenfelter
and D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3, Elsevier: Amsterdam, 2165-
2214.
[65] Pellizzari, Michele (2005) “Employers’ Search and the Eﬃciency of Matching,” IZA Discus-
sion Paper, 1862.
[66] Petrongolo, Barbara and Christopher A. Pissarides (2001) “Looking into the Black Box: A
Survey of the Matching Function,” Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2), 390-431.
[67] Pissarides, Christopher A. (1974) “Risk, Job Search, and Income Distribution,” Journal of
Political Economy, 82, 1255-68.
[68] Pissarides, Christopher A. (2000) Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, second edition.
[69] Postel-Vinay, Fabien and Jean-Marc Robin (2002) “Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with
Worker and Employer Heterogeneity,” Econometrica, 70, 2295-2350.
[70] Roberts, Mark J. and James Tybout, (1997) "The Decision to Export in Colombia: An
Empirical Model of Entry with Sunk Costs," American Economic Review, 87(4), 545-64.
[71] Rosen, Sherwin (1982) “Authority, Control and the Distribution of Earnings,” Bell Journal
of Economics, 13, 311-23.
[72] Schank, Thorsten, Claus Schanbel and Joachim Wagner (2007) “Do Exporters Really Pay
Higher Wages? First Evidence from German Linked Employer-Employee Data,” Journal of
International Economics, 72, 52-74.
[73] Shimer, Robert and Lones Smith (2000) “Assortative Matching and Search,” Econometrica,
68, 343-369.
39[74] Stole, Lars A. and Jeﬀrey Zwiebel (1996a) “Organizational Design and Technology Choice
under Intraﬁrm Bargaining,” American Economic Review, 86, 195-222.
[75] Stole, Lars A. and Jeﬀrey Zwiebel (1996b) “Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding
Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies, 63, 375-410.
[76] Van Reenen, John (1996) “The Creation and Capture of Economic Rents: Wages and
Innovation in a Panel of UK Companies,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 195-226.
[77] Yeaple, Stephen R. (2005) “A Simple Model of Firm Heterogeneity, International Trade,
and Wages,” Journal of International Economics, 65, 1—20.
40CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
939 Norman  Ireland 
Robin A. Naylor 
Jeremy Smith 
Shqiponja Telhaj 
Educational Returns, Ability Composition and 
Cohort Effects: Theory and Evidence for 
Cohorts of Early-Career UK Graduates 
938 Guy  Mayraz 
Jürgen Schupp 
Gert Wagner 
Life Satisfaction and Relative Income: 
Perceptions and Evidence 
937 Nicholas  Bloom 
Raffaella Sadun 
John Van Reenen 
The Organization of Firms Across Countries 
936 Jean-Baptiste  Michau  Unemployment Insurance and Cultural 
Transmission: Theory and Application to 
European Unemployment 
935  João M. C. Santos-Silva 
Silvana Tenreyro 
Trading Partners and Trading Volumes: 
Implementing the Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein 
Model Empirically 
934 Christian  Morrisson 
Fabrice Murtin 
The Century of Education 
933  João M. C. Santos-Silva 
Silvana Tenreyro 
Further Simulation Evidence on the 
Performance of the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator 
932  João M. C. Santos-Silva 
Silvana Tenreyro 
On the Existence of the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimates for Poisson Regressioin 
931 Richard  Freeman 
John Van Reenen 
What If Congress Doubled R&D Spending on 
the Physical Sciences? 
930 Hector  Calvo-Pardo 
Caroline Freund 
Emanuel Ornelas 
The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Impact on 
Trade Flows and External Trade Barriers 
929 Dan  Anderberg 
Arnaud Chevalier 
Jonathan Wadsworth 
Anatomy of a Health Scare: Education, Income 
and the MMR Controversy in the UK 
928 Christos  Genakos 
Mario Pagliero 
Risk Taking and Performance in Multistage 
Tournaments: Evidence from Weightlifting 
Competitions 
927 Nick  Bloom 
Luis Garicano 
Raffaella Sadun 
John Van Reenen 
The Distinct Effects of Information 
Technology and Communication Technology 
on Firm Organization 926  Reyn van Ewijk  Long-term health effects on the next 
generation of Ramadan fasting during 
pregnancy 
925  Stephen J. Redding  The Empirics of New Economic Geography 




Employee Voice and Private Sector Workplace 
Outcomes in Britain, 1980-2004 
923  Bianca De Paoli  Monetary Policy Under Alterative Asset 
Market Structures: the Case of a Small Open 
Economy 
922  L. Rachel Ngai 
Silvana Tenreyro 
Hot and Cold Seasons in the Housing Market 
921 Kosuke  Aoki 
Gianluca Benigno 
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki 
Capital Flows and Asset Prices 
920 Alex  Bryson 
John Forth 
Patrice Laroche 
Unions and Workplace Performance in Britain 
and France 
919 David  Marsden 
Simone Moriconi 
‘The Value of Rude Health’: Employees’ Well 
Being, Absence and Workplace Performance 
918 Richard  Layard 
Guy Mayraz 
Stephen Nickell 
Does Relative Income Matter? Are the Critics 
Right? 
917 Ralf  Martin 
Laure B. de Preux 
Ulrich J. Wagner 
The Impacts of the Climate Change Levy on 
Business: Evidence from Microdata 
916 Paul-Antoine  Chevalier 
Rémy Lecat 
Nicholas Oulton 
Convergence of Firm-Level Productivity, 
Globalisation, Information Technology and 
Competition: Evidence from France 
915 Ghazala  Azmat 
Nagore Iriberri 
The Importance of Relative Performance 
Feedback Information: Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment using High School 
Students 
914  L Rachel Ngai 
Robert M. Samaniego 
Accounting for Research and Productivity 
Growth Across Industries 
913 Francesco  Caselli 
Tom Cunningham 
Leader Behavior and the Natural Resource 
Curse 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel 020 7955 7284  Fax 020 7955 7595  Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Web site http://cep.lse.ac.uk  